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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Throughout this brief "TR" refers to the transcript from the trial, individual 
hearings are referred to as "TR" followed by the date of the hearing, "R" refers to the 
record on appeal, and "Ex." refers to exhibit. "TBT" refers to the appellant, TBT 
Property Management, Inc., and "UDOT" refers to the Utah Department of 
Transportation. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
TBT appeals from a final order of the Fourth District Court for Utah County, the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of 
Utah, and 78A-4-l 03 (2) (j), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. I 
THE DESIGNATION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF A "RJGHT OF 
ACCESS TO THE NEAREST ROADWAY OF SAID HIGHWAY OVER AND 
ACROSS THE PIONEER CROSSING RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE FOR A 66-FOOT 
SECTION" DOES NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFINE, CONSTITUTE, OR 
ESTABLISH A VIABLE ACCESS FROM TOT'S REMAINING LAND TO AN 
ESTABLISHED ROADWAY SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES PURSUANT TO §§78B-6-511 AND 512, U.C.A. 
Standards of Review: Interpretation of statutes is an issue of law and the court 
reviews for correctness. Garcia v. Garcia, 2002 UT App 381, ,4, 60 P.3d. 1174. 
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The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for correctness, granting no 
deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County. 
2003 UT 28, iJ4, 73 P .3d 362. Questions oflaw are reviewed for correctness, giving 
no deference to the lower court's legal conclusions. Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, if 12, 
44 P.3d. 742. The effect of a given state of facts is a question oflaw and, therefore, 
one on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's decision. State v. 
Pena, 869 P .2d 932 (Utah 1994) 
Issue Preserved: 
Motion in Limine in re Access, supporting Memorandum, and Affidavits. (R. 222, 
263) 
Objection to Motion to Amend Complaint (R. 95) 
Ruling - Tr. January 7, 2013, p. 4. 
Trial - Tr. 1032-1033 
ISSUE NO. 2 
THE DISTRJCT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND 
ITS COMPLAINT WHEN THE AMENDMENT FAILED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO MATERJALL Y CHANGE OR MODIFY THE NATURE AND EXTENT 
OF THE TAKING AND DAMAGES DESCRIBED IN THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT. 
Standards of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for 
correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, 
2 
2003 UT 28, 'j14. Granting or denial of motion to amend is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. Carlile v. Wal-Mart, 2002 UT App 412, 'i16, 61 P.3d 287. 
Issue Preserved: 
Objection to Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. 95) 
Motion in Limine re Access, Memorandum, and Affidavits. (R. 222, 263) 
ISSUE NO. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT TBT'S COUNSEL WOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT CROSS EXAMINATION OF UDOT'S 
EXPERT APPRAISAL WITNESS RELATIVE TO AN APPRAISAL OF THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY CONDUCTED BY SAID WITNESS OF THE PROPERTY 
IN SEPTEMBER, 2008, APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE DATE 
OF TAKING IN THIS ACTION, IN REFERENCE TO COMPRABLE SALES AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF MARK.ET VALUE AS REFLECTED IN SAID REPORT. 
Standards of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for 
correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, 
2003 UT 28, ,I4. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to 
the lower court's legal conclusions. Spears, 2002 UT 24, 'j112, 44 P.3d. 742; Kohler v. 
Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912 (UT App. 1996). 
A court's improper admission of evidence is a ground for reversal only where the 
court's erroneous ruling was prejudicial. City of Hilldale v. Cooke 2001 UT 56, i{30, 
28 P.3d 697; UDOT v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Utah 1984). 
Issue Preserved: 
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Trial - Tr. 18 January, 2013, pp. 927-32. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO VIEW THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY THAT INCLUDES THE DISPUTED ACCESS AREA BECAUSE Q 
SUCH CONVEYS AN UNWARRANTED FALSE AND PREJUDICIAL ELEMENT 
OF VALIDITY OF THE ALLEGED ACCESS, WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OR TESTMONY. 
Standards of Review: The appellate cow1 reviews the district court's ruling for Q 
correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Amsource, 
2003 UT 28, if4. 
A court's improper admission of evidence is a ground for reversal only where the 
court's erroneous ruling was prejudicial. City of Hilldale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, if30. 
Issue Preserved: 
Hearing - Tr. 21 Dec. 2012, p. 5., Tr. 769-780. 
ISSUE NO. 5 
THE JURY VERDICT IS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
OR TESTMONY. 
Standards of Review: Supreme Court will upset jury verdict only upon showing 
that evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of appellant that reasonable people 
would not differ on outcome of case. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 
(Utah 1996). On appeal from a jury verdict, we relate the facts in the light most 
4 
r'i ~ 
favorable to that verdict. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1073 
(Utah 1991 ). Present conflicting evidence only to the extent necessary to understand 
the issues raised on appeal. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1993). 
When considering challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence, 
we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the 
jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." 
Billings, 918 P .2d at 467. 
Issue Preserved: 
Motion in Limine re Access, Memorandum, and Affidavits. (R. 222) 
Trial - Tr. I 032; Tr. 775. 
ISSUE NO. 6 
THE MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND THE BUILDING OF THE 
ROADWAY IN QUESTION CONSTITUTED A BAD FAITH EFFORT BY UDOT 
TO A VOID PA YING JUST COMPENSATION AND ENTITLES TBT TO 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
Standards of Review: The appellate court reviews the district court's ruling for 
correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions. Woodbury Am.source, 
2003 UT 28, ,I4. A finding of bad faith is a mixed question oflaw and fact that turns 
on a factual determination of a party's subjective intent. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 315-16 (Utah 1998). 
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Issue Preserved: 
Tr. Of January 9, 2012 motion hearing, pp. 6-8. 
Trial judge addressed issues of dilatory filing and bad faith (R. 142). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS 
The following rules have application in this appeal and are included in the 
Addendum due to length: 
§78B-6-511, U.C.A. (Addendum A) 
§78B-6-512, U.C.A. (Addendum B) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This is an action in eminent domain instituted by UDOT to condemn a portion of 
the real property situated in Lehi City, Utah County, State of Utah, belonging to the 
appellant, TBT to enable UDOT to construct a limited access public highway, known 
commonly as the Pioneer Crossing Highway. The proceeding sought to determine just 
compensation for the area condemned and severance damages to the remainder tract. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
1. UDOT, filed its Complaint in this action on December 7, 2009, seeking to 
condemn in fee 9.87 acres and temporary easements, comprising 0.43 acres of 
real property owned by TBT, and any and all access rights appurtenant to the 
6 
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remaining property for direct access onto Pioneer Crossing Highway, such 
property being part of a total tract of 56.9 acres, situated in the city of Lehi, 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Such condemnation sought to acquire property and property interests for state 
transportation purposes as defined in U.C.A. 72-5-102. 
3. After several months of unsuccessful negotiations that involved the State 
Ombudsman, TBT retained counsel who filed an Answer and Demand for Jury 
Trial on June 23, 2010. 
4. On May 26, 2011, UDOT filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint, together 
with a Memorandum in support. (R. 61) 
5. On September 1, 2011, TBT filed an Objection to Motion to Amend 
Complaint, together with a memorandum and supporting affidavits. 
6. UDOT filed a Reply and Response to the Objection to Motion to Amend 
Complaint. (R. 9 5) 
7. On January 19, 2012, the court conducted a hearing on the Motion to Amend 
Complaint, and on March 7, 2012, the court issued its ruling granting the 
Motion to Amend Complaint. (R. 146) 
8. On October 26, 2012, TBT filed a Motion in Limine In Re: Access, together 
with a memorandum and affidavits in support. (R. 222, 263) 
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9. On November 18, 2012, UDOT filed its response to said motion in Limine. (R. 
268) 
10. On December 21, 2012, a hearing was held to resolve the issues raised by the 
Motion in Limine, which motion was denied by a minute entry dated January 
7, 2013. (R. 303) 
11. The case thereafter proceeded to jury trial, which was conducted on January 
14, 16 -18, and 24 of 2013, at the conclusion of which a verdict was rendered 
by the jury and a Judgment on Verdict was entered February I, 2013. 
12. Notice of Appeal was filed by TBT on February 6, 2013. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court: 
This case was tried before a jury January 14, 16-18, 24, 2013, the Honorable Steven L. 
Hansen, district judge, presiding. A "Final Judgment of Condemnation" was entered 
April 3, 2013, awarding defendant TBT $2,936,268.00. An Amended Notice of Appeal 
was filed April I 0, 2013. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I. TBT is a Utah corporation, and at the time of the commencement of this action 
an owner of real property located in the city of Lehi, Utah County, State of Utah, with 
access along 8020 North Street (an extension of American Fork Main Street), and 
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bounded on the west by Millpond road for a distance of approximately 1,250 feet. (R. 
11) 
2. UDOT instituted this action in eminent domain on December 7, 2009, to 
construct and maintain a public highway as a limited access highway, called Pioneer 
Crossing highway, extending from I-15 on the east to Redwood Road on the west, 
bordering the southern boundary of the subject property. (R.11, 63) 
3. The Utah County Treasurer was named as a defendant solely for the purpose of 
any property tax issues and did not participate in this action. (R. 11) 
4. The real property owned in fee by TBT, comprised approximately 56.9 acres. 
Within the area of the property there exists a fresh water pond of approximately 18 
acres and "jurisdictional wetlands" of 6.95 acres. (TR.561, 566-567) 
5. The area condemned in fee consists of 10.53 acres, two temporary construction 
easements of .43 acres and "including all rights of ingress and egress to Pioneer 
Crossing highway from the owners remaining property contiguous to the land 
conveyed," which left a balance of 21.31 acres that remain available for development 
as a business park, which plan was in progress of being implemented. (TR. 474, 561-
562, 567-568) 
6. The parties stipulated to a date of taking as March 30, 2009. At the time of 
taking the subject property was zoned "A-5", however it had been approved by the 
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Lehi City Planning Commission for business park development. (R. 476,529, 551; 
Ex. 11) 
7. Prior to condemnation, the property had access to 8020 North Street (an 
extension of American Fork Main Street) for a distance of approximately 1,200 feet 
and along Millpond Road for a distance of approximately, 1,250 feet. (R. 487,557; 
Tr. 347) 
8. Addenda D, E, and F provide a visual view of the property boundaries. (R. 253, 
Ex. 1) 
9. As a result of the condemnation action, the property described in the original 
Complaint was left with no access along the south boundary, and restricted access 
along Millpond Road for a distance of 475 feet. (Tr. 558; R. 558-559) 
10. The summons was served on TBT on December 10, 2009 (R. 34), after which 
TBT filed its Answer & Demand for Jury on June 23, 2010. (R. 41) 
11. By agreement the date oftalcing is not the date of service of the summons but 
March 30, 2009, the date of a Right of Entry and Occupancy Agreement entered into 
by the parties. (R. 99). 
12. Central to this case and the issues on appeal is the existence of parcel of 
property situated in the vicinity of the southeast portion of the subject property, owned 
by a party referred to in the record and testimony by the name of Savage, d/b/a/ 
10 
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Affordable Storage, situated contiguously to the subject property, and upon which are 
constructed rental storage units. (R. 162) 
13. The subject property lies entirely within the boundary of Lehi City. The 
Savage property lies entirely within the boundary of American Fork City. (Ex. 1; Tr. 
159) 
14. For the project UDOT acquired a small comer of the Savage property, together 
with all rights of ingress and egress to Pioneer Crossing public highway, leaving the 
Savage property landlocked. (Tr. 713) 
15. To avoid buying the Savage property or putting Savage out of business (Tr. 
714-715), UDOT got the idea of creating an access to the west boundary of said 
property via access from Pioneer Crossing Highway. This access became what is 
referred to oftentimes in the proceedings as the construction of the "stubby road." (Tr. 
685) 
16. To facilitate this new access for Savage, and constituting the basis for the 
construction of an access road to the Savage storage units, three documents (Ex. 5) 
were created: the first of which is a Warranty Deed, dated April 12, 2010, from the 
Savages to UDOT conveying the small comer of the Savage storage property, together 
with relinquishment of all access rights to Pioneer Crossing Highway "[ e ]xcepting and 
reserving to Grantor, their successors or assigns, the right of access from their western 
11 
boundary of Grantor's remaining property over the right-of-way to a future city 
road."(Ex. 5; Tr. 197) The second, was a Right-of-Way Contract wherein Savages are 
Grantors and UDOT Grantee, and thlrd, an Access Approval, which states, in part, that 
Savage " ... shall hold hamtless the State of Utah and its employees from all damages 
and arising out of the use, including the snow removal, of the access under this 
Permit."--the stubby road, or sometimes referred to as a "future American Fork street." 
(Ex. 5; Tr. 198) 
17. On May 26, 2011, more than one year after establishing this access for 
Savage, UDOT filed a motion to amend its complaint (R. 61), together with a 
supporting Memorandum (R. 83), and an Amended Resolution. (R. 75) The relevant 
new language added: " ... EXCEPTING and reserving to said Owners, their successors 
or assigns, the right of access to the nearest roadway of said highway over and across 
the Pioneer Crossing right of way line for a 66-foot section [ as more fully described in 
parcel 2440 of the amended complaint, such parcel being in proximity to the "stubby 
road"] ... " (R. 7 5) 
18. There is no actual legal description of the "stubby road." There is no recorded 
legal description of the access road to the Savage property, nor has access been 
identified as anything other than reference to "a future city street." (Tr. 698) 
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19. The roadway built to the Savage property extended north from Pioneer 
Crossing highway to the city line between Lehi City and American Fork City, at which 
point it terminates. (Ex. 2) Between the end of the said road and the 66 foot section 
of the right-of-way line on the TBT property, there is a triangular unimproved parcel, 
located in Lehi City, and measuring 25 feet on the west side of the triangle and zero on 
the east side. (Tr. 716, 719, 158-161; Ex. 2) All of the improved access road lies 
within American Fork City, and that is the area identified in the Permit. (Ex. 5) 
20. Thus, the road does not extend to the 66-foot section in the TBT property line. 
Derrick S. Smith, surveyor for TBT, testified that there exists a triangular piece of 
property between the end of the pavement of the road built for Savage and the 66-foot 
access point. (Tr. 158-161) 
21. Of relevance in this case is another agreement called the "Cooperative 
Agreement" (Ex. 10) entered into between UDOT, Utah County, the cities of Saratoga 
Springs, Lehi, and American Fork, which agr~ement in large part embodies certain 
planning concepts designating how traffic would be controlled on the Pioneer Crossing 
Highway, and which designates Pioneer Crossing Highway as a Category 3 highway 
with limited access. (Ex. 1 O; Tr. 725) 
22. A Category 3 Highway requires that accesses to such a highway will be at 
signalized intersections only along its corridor, (Tr. 293) and no other accesses to 
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Pioneer Crossing road will be allowed except at the existing UT A Park & Ride facility 
unless approved in writing by all parties. (Tr. 288-289) 
23. TBT retained Ryan Hales, a professional engineer, specializing in traffic 
engineering, licensed by the State of Utah (R. 23 5), who testified that Pioneer Crossing 
Highway was designated as a limited access highway. (Tr. 288-289) 
24. The "stubby-road'' area, referred to in testimony as an access, is not listed in 
the Cooperative Agreement for a point of access to the Pioneer Crossing Highway. (Tr. 
287-289) 
25. Ray Bennett is a Utah certified general appraiser, lead agent for projects, and 
oversight manager for projects known as "Access Utah County." (Tr. 998) In 
response to questions about the "stubby road" he testified: 
"It's a- it's an interesting tenn, but UDOT has never had such a 'stubby 
road' term, nor did we ever intend to build a road. We intended to make a 
66-foot break in the right-of-way so when the owner wishes to develop, at 
such time it becomes appropriate and it's approved by the proper entities, 
the cities-in this case it would be Lehi and American Fork, both, it would 
appear - then and only then, in conjunction with UDOT, they can develop 
that access, and most likely - it would be that it won't be altered at all, and 
it could be that it would be altered significantly." (Tr. 1019-1020) 
26. According to the project engineer for UDOT, Daniel 0. Avila (Tr. 506) an 
access was constructed from the stubby road to the west boundary of the Savage 
property, and an apron that allows Savages to access the Savage property along its 
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west boundary with two gates. This was the purpose of building the stubby road. (Tr. 
718) 
27. Avila testified that the stubby road was not a city street but a driveway to a 
business. (Tr. 698) 
28. Avila also testified that "in the 66-fot access, the LA line, meaning the 
'limited-access' line. That line allows for the public to move through, in this case, just 
the property owners, but in the future, that is how future city streets would tie into 
Pioneer Crossing." (Tr. 686) 
29. Defendant TBT filed an Objection to Motion to Amend Complaint, arguing, 
inter alia, that the Amended Complaint did not materially modify the original 
complaint and failed to form any basis for the claim of mitigation of damages, as a 
matter oflaw. (R. 95) 
30. UDOT argued in reply that there was in fact a basis for mitigation of damages 
due to the Amended Resolution providing for a 66-foot section in the line, alleging that 
such provided for "access to a future American Fork street." (R. 99; Ex. 3) 
31. UDOT's appraiser, J. Philip Cook, had published an appraisal report of the 
subject property with the effective valuation date of September 23, 2008. A copy of 
this report was delivered to TBT. The report was addressed to Mr. Greg Martin, 
H.D .R. Engineers. This same appraiser prepared and published a second appraisal 
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report of the subject property, using March 30, 2009, as the valuation date and the 
appraisal was relied upon by UDOT in testimony rendered in this action. (R. 7 42, 886) 
32. Based on a ruling by the court, cross examination of said witness relative to his 
findings and conclusions in the first report was limited to two items, viz.: 
(a) what amount of severance damages were shown in each report; and 
(b) whether the value conclusion in the frrst report was higher or lower than that 
shown in the second report of March 30, 2009. (Tr. 925-931) 
33. Jonathan Cook, appraiser for TBT, made a double appraisal of the subject 
property, the first based on the original complaint, and the second based upon an 
assumption that the court may allow a jury to consider the questionable 66-foot section 
as a benefit. 
34. The existence of the 66-foot section in the right-of-way line was considered 
important by J. Philip Cook in his testimony, where, in part, he testified: 
"The narrowing of that little area between the pond and the highway and 
the right in/ right out access replacing what was going to be no access, 
originally no access, all of that factored into a larger severance damage, and 
most of that as a loss of accessibility to the southeast. 
With that access restored that will facilitate development, I lowered my 
severance damages." (Tr. 977) 
But when asked if such access was not functional, adequate or valid, Mr. 
Cook answered, "Well, I've made an assessment from a real estate 
appraiser's prospective that it is adequate and functional, but if it is invalid 
I would have to revisit the appraisal." (Tr. 911) 
16 
; ",'.;"J xv 
3 5. J. Philip Cook, after the amendment to the Complaint, testified that as of the 
valuation date of March 30, 2009 the fair market value of the land taken in fee, was 
$1,680,726, $13,274 for temporary easements, and $51,000 for severance damages, for 
a "rounded" total of $1,745,000. (Tr. 743, 854) 
36. Appraiser Jonathan L. Cook, MAI, conducted an appraisal of the subject 
property on behalf of TBT, with a valuation date of March 30, 2009, which disclosed 
the fair market value of the subject property in the before condition to be $10,197,060. 
(R. 583) 
37. Jonathan Cook's report indicated a value of the 9.8 acres taken at 
$3,349,459.00 (R. 584; Ex. 17), the temporary easemenis at $39,920.00 (R. 588, 591; 
Ex. 20), and $3,390,316.00 as severance damages to the remainder tract. Such was 
based on the original Complaint prior to amendment. (R. 592-593) 
38. Following the filing of the amended complaint a second appraisal was 
conducted by Jonathan L. Cook, MAI, with a valuation date of March 30, 2009. (Ex. 
26) His report disclosed a value of the land taken in fee to be $3,390,316.00 (R. 616), 
severance damages of $2,199,684.00, and easements valued at $39,920.00. (R. 616; 
Ex. 26) 
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39. TBT engaged a second appraiser, Jerry Webber, MAI, who conducted an 
appraisal with an established valuation date of March 30, 2009. Mr. Webber only 
performed one appraisal, which was based on the amended complaint, and the 
"assumption" that an access to defendant landowners' remainder land existed. He 
concluded the fair market value of the property prior to condemnation to be 
$9,461,669.00. (R. 409; Ex. 24) 
40. Mr. Webber found the fair market value of the fee take to be $2,963,842.00, 
$16,692.00 for the easements, and severance damages of $2,784,782.00, for a total of 
$5,765,317.00. (R. 410-413; Ex. 24) 
41. Over the objection of counsel for TBT, the court allowed a view of the 
premises (R. 775, 788) The primary basis for the objection to a view was predicated 
upon the fact that UDOT had constructed a roadway and access to unrelated adjacent 
property (the Savage property) in the vicinity of the 66-foot section identified in the 
Amended Complaint, which would imply an unwarranted and false inference of a valid 
access being available to the remainder parcel ofTBT. Further, said property had, by 
reason of the project, been neglected in care and heavy construction equipment was 
being stored on parts of said property. 
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42. The issues went to the jury, and the following is the verdict of the jury: 
a. Fair market value of land taken of approximately 10 acres: 
$1,877,194.00 
b. Value of two temporary easements: 
$14,983.00 
c. Damages to remainder tract (severance damages): 
$1,044,091.00 
TOTAL: $2,936,268.00 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
UDOT commenced an action in eminent domain in 2009 to acquire from TBT a 
ten acre portion of a larger tract. The issues for trial were the value of the taking and 
the value of severance damages. An adjoining property owner by the name of Savage 
maintained a facility consisting of private storage units for rent by the general public. 
The UDOT project took a small portion of the Savage property and removed all access, 
leaving Savage with no legal access to the highway. Rather than pay Savage full 
compensation for an uneconomic unit, UDOT provided Savage with a contract and 
permit to use undedicated road from the Pioneer Crossing Highway to the west 
boundary of the Savage property, often referred to in the course of the proceedings as 
"the stubby road." 
Subsequently, UDOT sought to amend their Complaint by adding the language 
" ... excepting and reserving to said Owners . . . the right of access to the nearest 
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roadway of said highway over and across the Pioneer Crossing right-of-way line for a 
66-foot section ... " with the goal being that the access road built for Savage, 
mitigated its severance damages to TBT, even though the road, at best, is really only a 
"future American Fork street." (The 66 foot section is in proximity of the Savage 
road, but the road does not extend to the TB T property line and that 66 foot section. 
TBT has not been granted any license, permit, or other right to use the road built for 
Savage.) The trial court wrongfully allowed the amendment to the complaint since the 
mitigation claimed was illusory because such did not in truth provide any viable access 
from the TBT remainder tract to the Pioneer Crossing Highway. 
TBT filed a Motion in Limine asking the court to declare, as a matter of law, that 
the amendment as framed providing for access across a 66-foot section in the right-of-
way line did not constitute a mitigation of damages. The court took the position that 
whether or not the road was a legal highway that provided legal access to the TBT 
remainder tract was a fact issue for the jury, along with the issue of deciding damages. 
Testimony from UDOT witnesses was uniform in stating that the stubby road 
constructed in the area of the 66-foot section constituted a future American Fork city 
street, or future city street to be built at an unknown time with unknown specifications. 
The expert appraiser for UDOT, J. Phillip Cook, had performed an appraisal of the 
TBT property for the same UDOT project addressed to Greg Martin, HDR 
20 
G 
Q 
Engineering, which appraisal was performed approximately 6 months prior to the 
taking in this case on March 30, 2009. The market value set forth in said report was 
different than the value he placed on the same property when he did the appraisal on 
March 30, 2009. The court refused to allow that testimony to come in on cross 
examination. The value in the first appraisal would have impeached, to some degree, 
the second appraisal relied upon in his testimony, and constitutes prejudice and denial 
of due process of law. 
During the trial the court erred in permitting the jury to view the property. Since 
the date of taking, the condition of the land has deteriorated for lack of care. A good 
deal of machinery has been parked on the property, and most importantly, allowing the 
jury to view a road that to a layman may give the appearance of providing legal and 
valid access to the TBT property. 
Finally, if, as we contend, the "roadway'' relied upon by UDOT' s expert witness is 
not a legal, dedicated public road, but only potentially a "future street" or "future 
American Fork street," the value placed on severance damages by the UDOT expert 
appraiser is without merit and foundation, leaving no valid lower-end verdict; this 
resulting in a verdict award that is not within the range of the expert testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE NO. 1 
THE DESIGNATION IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT OF A "RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO THE NEAREST ROADWAY OF SAID HIGHWAY OVER AND 
ACROSS THE PIONEER CROSSING RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE FOR A 66-FOOT 
SECTION" DOES NOT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFINE, CONSTITUTE, OR 
ESTABLISH A VIABLE ACCESS FROM TDT'S REMAINING LAND TO AN 
ESTABLISHED ROADWAY SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR 
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES PURSUANT TO §§78B-6-511 AND 512, U.C.A. 
In the Resolution attached to the Amended Complaint, UDOT alleges it provided 
TBT a 66-foot wide opening in the right-of-way line, located in the southeast comer of 
the TBT property, in the vicinity of the Savage property, and approximately 75 feet 
north of the completed Pioneer Crossing roadway. (The issues of mitigation and 
justification for the Amended Complaint and the validity of access to the TBT property 
are closely interrelated, and some crossover of argument is necessary for a full 
discussion of both issues.) In assessing damages Utah law provides, in pertinent part, G 
that "[t]he court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in its 
assessment of compensation and damages, if after the date of service of summons, the 
plaintiff: (a) mitigates the damages to the property ... " See §78B-6-512, U.C.A. 
To deal with the issue of whether or not a valid and viable access existed from the 
66-foot wide section in the right-of-way line to the Pioneer Crossing roadway, TBT 
filed a Motion in Limine re Access (R.222, 263 ), wherein the trial judge was asked to 
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rule, as a matter of law, that no such viable access existed, that no such special benefit 
to the subject existed. TBT renewed its Motion in Limine, on several occasions, the 
last occurring at the end of the trial. In again denying the motion, the court ruled: 
"I've issued a ruling once on the motion to amend the complaint when I 
considered this, and once on the motion in limine, and now that I've heard 
the evidence it is clear to me that the jury has before it, from both sides, to 
allow them to come to a conclusion, based on the facts, as to whether or not 
UDOT has mitigated its damages in relationship to the severance damages 
in this case. So the motion is denied." (Tr. 1033) 
In one of the earlier rulings on these points the trial judge stated and ruled as 
follows: 
"[B]asically the motion is denied. I feel like this is a question for the jury 
to consider whether UDOT has mitigated the damages by providing access 
to the remainder of defendants' land. I can give you more of the basis for 
that decision, if you'd like, but it's basically - - the right of access in the 
amended complaint has been established by sufficient evidence now to 
submit the question to the jury to decide whether or not UDOT has, indeed, 
mitigated damages by providing access, as I just said. 
The statute, as you both are very familiar with, says district courts aren't 
required to consider mitigation or reduction of damages when determine 
compensation to an owner of condemned property. The Court or the jury 
shall consider mitigation and reduction of damages in its assessment of 
compensation if, after the date of the summons, the plaintiff mitigates the 
damages to the property or reduces the amount of the property actually 
taken." 
The thrust of these rulings by the trial judge resulted in the jury deciding whether 
or not mitigation had occurred, which was error. The issue of whether or not 
mitigation had occurred, as opposed to the value of any mitigation, was a question of 
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law, and should not have been left to the jury. The court should have first dealt with 
whether or not an access has been created of such nature as to constitute a basis for 
mitigation of damages. It was error to allow a jury to make such determination. 
This court dealt with the spectrum of review of trial court issues of law in State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). In Pena the Supreme Court provided 
criteria for assessing what deference should be given to the district court, as follows: 
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex 
and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of these facts 
can be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to 
be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable 
to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome 
determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge has observed "facts" such as a 
witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law 
that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate 
courts. Id. at 939. 
These factors put the mitigation issue at the end of the spectrum where little or no 
deference should be given to the court and mandate that the trial judge in this case 
should have ruled, as a matter of law, whether or not a viable, legal access from the 
TBT property to the Pioneer Crossing roadway existed, and should not have been left 
to the jury for speculation. 
It is clear at the outset the burden of establishing a special benefit rests upon the 
condemning authority. See Territory of Mendonca, 375 P.2d 6 (HI 1962); 29A CJS 
Eminent Domain,§ 171, pp. 425; 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed. §18.5. The 
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Mendonca court stated the facts were clear, and the appeal was only over whether the 
benefit was general or special. That being the case, Mendonca ruled that the nature 
and extent of a general benefit is a question of fact, but "the nature and definition of a 
special benefit, as contrasted with that of a general benefit, is a question of law." Id. at 
2- In Utah it has long been the law that UDOT is only entitled to offset special 
benefits, as opposed to general benefits. Hempstead v. Salt Lake City. 90 P. 397,400 
(Utah 1907). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals dealt with a situation where the plaintiff property-
owners brought an action in inverse condemnation, which action was dismissed by the 
lower court on a motion for summary judgment. Reisenauer v. State of Idaho, 
Department of Highways, 813 P.2d 375 (Idaho App. 1991). The predecessors in 
interest to the plaintiffs had already been paid full compensation for the right-of-way 
taken, and the court in Reisenauer was confronted with whether a new servitude was 
placed on the plaintiffs resulting from construction within the already acquired right-
of-way. In deciding that no new servitude was imposed or created by the project, the 
court observed that "In an eminent domain action, the only issue for the jury is 
compensation for the land and the damages thereto. The issue of whether a taking 
occurred is a question of law for the trial court to determine. (M., at 377) 
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A similar ruling is echoed in the case of Brock v. State Highway Comm. 404 P.2d 
934 (Ka. 1965), where the court was dealing with an alleged taking of a common-law 
access to a pre-existing highway. The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the lower 
court's ruling that the construction of a frontage road in place of the direct access to 
the newly widened main highway was not a compensable taking, and in doing so ruled 
in part: 
"The appellants contend that it was highly prejudicial and clearly error to 
let the jury decide if there had been a taking. If the appellants did not 
establish a taking of access rights, there should have been no question 
whatsoever for the jury to decide. As in any other condemnation case, 
whether there is a taking of a property right is a question of law, and must 
be decided by the court ... 
In all condemnation cases the only question presented for the jury's 
determination is the loss to the owner because of the property taken. The 
fact that there was a taking has been previously determined by the court." 
(Id. at 940) 
The case of Triangle, Inc. v. State, 632 P.2d 965 (Alaska 1981) is likewise 
instructive. In Triangle a lessee of real property sought compensation for deprivation 
of direct access to an abutting highway. The primary focus of the court was whether 
the superior court decided as a matter of law that the plaintiff had been deprived of a 
compensable right. In its ruling the Alaskan Supreme Court held: 
[I]t is for the trial court to determine whether the case before it presents a 
compensable claim for loss of access or merely a claim for traffic diversion, 
which is non-compensable ... 
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It is only when a trial court concludes that the landowner has presented a 
valid claim that the case is submitted to the jury for a determination of the 
extent of the taking and the amount of compensation that must be paid by 
the state." Id., at 968) 
In Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah App. 1996) this court was 
confronted with a case dealing with a claim that private property had been dedicated to 
public use. In applying the Pena guidelines this court ruled that "We require that the 
dedication of property to the public be proven by clear and convincing evidence." 
The same standard should apply to the TBT case, that is, whether or not property 
owned by the State of Utah has been properly and legally converted to a public use, 
which conversion should be decided, as a matter of law, by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
Accordingly, the trial judge had a duty to decide, as a matter oflaw, the issue of 
whether or not a viable and legal access existed between the right-of-way line in the 
southeast comer of the TBT property and the Pioneer Crossing roadway. UDOT was 
the architect of the instruments-the original resolution and Complaint, and the 
amended resolution and Amended Complaint. What then has UDOT created between 
the right-of-way line and Pioneer Crossing roadway? A "future American Fork City 
street," a "future road," a private driveway for Savage? With all of the infirmities 
present, nothing has been created that can be of use by TBT, as a matter oflaw, and 
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therefore severance damage testimony and alleged mitigation evidence stemming from Q 
the alleged existence of legal access, as a matter of law, should not have been allowed. 
Some of this evidence is presented in our Statement of Relevant Facts, but that 
evidence constitutes only a small portion of the actual testimony; in fact, one need not 
look further than the evidence and testimony furnished by UDOT' s own witnesses to 
fmd ample support for TBT's claim that UDOT failed, as a matter oflaw, to furnish 
clear and convincing proof that constitutes a basis for mitigation of damages. A 
canvas of such evidence and testimony follows: 
UDOT's response to TBT's objection to the Motion to Amend Complaint alleges: 
a. "The Amended Resolution has revised the no access line and an access to a 
future American Fork street has been added." (R. 99) (Emphasis added.) 
b. During argument on the issue of amending the Complaint some of the 
statements by court and counsel are helpful: (Tr. of Jan. 9, 2012 hearing, pp 13-15) 
COURT: "Well, explain to me your response to Mr. Wall's argument that the 
future existing road that may not be there. That's surely relevant as to severance 
damages." 
COUNSEL for UDOT: "Well, that road will come when his clients choose to 
develop the property or when American Fork chooses to develop the road. You know, 
it's-what we're amending isn't- - is just to give them- - well, what we are amending 
is a change of the no-access line. 
COURT: Well, how is a jury supposed to determine that? 
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COUNSEL: The access - - well, that will be their issue, and - -
COURT: Well, how will they resolve that? ... 
COUNSEL: They'll have the assistance of appraisers. We'll talk to them about it. 
We'll probably bring in the American Fork planners to talk to them about that." [No 
one from American Fork ever testified.] 
Atpp. 15-16 
COURT: And what's your response to Mr. Wall's argument about the Savage 
property and the argument that the State is - - using his word, "gotcha now," with the 
bootstrapping the argument into the Savage property? 
COUNSEL: There are several factors. 
COURT: That you took the property and then you reduced the amount of the 
money. 
COUNSEL: I'll come to that one. 
COURT: Okay. 
COUNSEL: The Savage property - - right. There was - - the way it was originally 
planned, all of a sudden they were landlocked. 
COURT: Uh-huh. 
COUNSEL: And so, through negotiation with the Savages, the State constructed 
this stub road. That stub road is part of the State right-of-way. There is a separate road 
that goes over to the east of Savage. That's the one that Savage has to maintain. The 
road that's within the State right-of-way, the main stub, you lmow, that's the State's. 
At some point we expect it will become American Fork's." 
Daniel Avila, the project engineer, testified at length about the nature of the access 
held by TB T, including the following examples: 
29 
a. "The 66-foot access, the LA line, meaning the 'limited-access' access line ... 
allows for the public to move through, in this case, just the property owners, but in the 
future, that is how future city streets would tie into Pioneer Crossing." (Tr. 686) 
b. "We can't be here making decisions how a future city street is going to be in 
private property, so all our business was to say, 'Okay. This is going to be a future 
location for a city street,' and UDOT fixed this point. How this changes, how this 
access to these businesses, that is subject for future discussions, development. ... " 
(Tr. 687) 
c. "All I can tell you is that we have informed TBT that there is a possibility for 
access." (Tr. 699) 
d. When asked about the 66-foot break in the no-access line, as described in the 
Amended Complaint, Mr. Avila stated: "So that access can be granted temporarily to 
Affordable Storage units so they didn't have to go out of business, and also so that, in 
the future, at the time American Fork City decides, that may become an access of a 
city street to Pioneer Crossing." (Tr. 700) 
e. COUNSEL for UDOT: " ... At some point in the future when development 
plans happen, changes can be made; is that correct? 
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f. He made it clear that the improvement, the road to the Savage property, was 
taken to the city line, and that there was no improvement between the city line and the 
TBT property. (Tr. 716) 
MR. AVILA: This is not a City Street. This is just a driveway to a business." 
(Tr. 698) ... 
COUNSEL for UDOT: "And the purpose for that break in the no-access line is 
what? 
MR. A VILA: So that access can be granted temporarily to Affordable Storage 
units so they don't have to go out of business, and also so that, in the future, at the time 
American Fork City decides, that may become an access of a City Street to Pioneer 
Crossing." (Tr. 700) ... 
TBT COUNSEL: "[S]o there's been an access that has been constructed from the 
stubby road back to the west boundary of the savage property? 
MR. A VILA: Yes. 
COUNSEL TBT: Is that your understanding -and that was really the purpose of 
that-building that stubby road? 
MR. AVILA: Yes." (Tr. 718) ... 
COUNSEL TBT: Tell this jury, if you will, when is that street going to come into 
existence as a city road? 
MR. A VILA: I don't know." (Tr. 707) 
Limitation of space prevents all of the testimony of the project engineer, however 
we represent that reference to the entire testimony of said witness will amplify the lack 
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of planning, clarification of responsibilities and issue relating to the establishment of 
any support for the claim that there has been a mitigation of damages. (See Tr. 668-
773) 
UDOT'S appraiser, J. PHILIP COOK testimony: 
COUNSEL FOR TBT: "Did you do any analysis or study of the so-called access 
road that we are talking about? 
1.1R. COOK: There is testimony to that. I told you - - as a real estate appraiser, 
I've detennined it's adequate to develop that property." (Tr. 947) ... 
COUNSEL FOR TBT: Let's go back to the deed from Savage. If you had 
investigated, you'd have found a right-of-way contract between UDOT and Savage. 
Were you aware of that contract? 
MR. COOK: No. 
COUNSEL: Were you aware of the fact that they gave Savages an access approval 
permit? 
MR. COOK: Not-only yesterday when I heard that testimony. 
COUNSEL: Did you ever inquire ofUDOT as to whether they had given a permit 
to my clients? 
MR. COOK: It's inherent in the amended complaint. 
COUNSEL: That's your conclusion. 
MR. COOK: That's my interpretation. 
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COUNSEL: Did you obtain any kind of a traffic study or analysis by a traffic 
engineer as to the safety aspect and the reasonableness of that stubby road for 
providing for vehicles going in and out and entering and exiting the lanes of travel? 
MR. COOK: I did not. 
COUNSEL: Did you make any measurements as to where that stubby road ends in 
relationship to the highway right-of-way line? 
MR. COOK: No, I did not. 
COUNSEL: If you had made those measurements, would it surprise you to learn 
that it does not extend into the right-of-way line? 
MR. COOK: No. 
COUNSEL: Would that make a difference in your opinion. 
MR. COOK: No. 
COUNSEL: So tell the jury, then what you just-what did you rely on in arriving 
at a conclusion that that all of a sudden fits the bill of being an adequate access? 
MR. COOK: Well, from years of experience, I know that typical minor collectors, 
which that city street-that street will eventually be are typically 66 feet wide. That's 
the width. I've already testified and told you that I've seen projects that have that type 
of access that serve even heavier intensity development than what would be built on 
this property. That's what I did." (Tr. 954-956) 
Ray Bennett is the oversight manager for projects known as "Access Utah 
County." (Tr. 998) He testified as follows: 
"It's a- it's an interesting term, but UDOT has never had such a 'stubby road' 
term, nor did we ever intend to build a road. We intended to make a 66-foot break in 
the right-of-way so when the owner wishes to develop, at such time it becomes 
appropriate and it's approved by the proper entities, the cities-in this case it would be 
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Lehi and American Fork, both, it would appear - then and only then, in conjunction Q 
with UDOT, they can develop that access, and most likely- it would be that it won't 
be altered at all, and it could be that it would be altered significantly." (Tr. 1019-1020) 
Two affidavits were submitted in support of the Motion In Limine in re Access 
that were, and remain, uncontested. Indeed, UDOT' s Memorandum filed in support of 
their opposition to the Motion in Limine (R. 268) fails to even broach the affidavits 
filed by TBT. 
One affidavit prepared by Ryan R. Hales, Professional Engineer, (R. 235), who 
conducted an investigation of the alleged access, states, in part, as follows: 
"2. That access to the Pioneer Crossing Highway from the remainder land of 
[TBT] is not allowed or permitted, save and except for the provision set forth in the 
Amended Complaint/Resolution aforesaid; ... 
6. The American Fork City, general plan for transportation does not identify a 
future street or roadway in the vicinity of the area in question or in the 2030 traffic 
projections or buildout conditions for said city." (R. 234)" 
Mr. Hales goes on to describe the Pioneer Crossing Highway as a Category 3 
highway which does not permit an access as contemplated in the Amended Complaint. 
(lg.) 
A second affidavit from Jonathan L. Cook (R. 232), evmces even more 
compelling, and again uncontroverted evidence, which provides, in part, as follows: 
That in the process of conducting the said appraisal the issue of evaluating and 
addressing the provision set forth in the Amended Complaint and Resolution, in 
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reference to "the right of access to the nearest roadway ... ," as more fully set forth in 
"Parcel 6:2440" was researched and analyzed; 
That part of the study and investigation conducted involved consultation with 
American Fork City Officials relative to the asserted claim by Plaintiff, as more fully 
set forth in Plaintiffs Reply to Interrogatories that said area involves future 
transportation needs of American Fork City and Plaintiffs claim that said area is a 
"future American Fork City street"; 
That said study investigation has revealed that American Fork City has no plan to 
include the area in question as a public street, has not designated the same as a public 
street and specifically does not want any responsibility for the maintenance or use of 
said area as a street or public thorofare [sic]. ... " (R. 232) 
Given this evidence, the court should have at some point granted the motion in 
Ii.mine. As a matter of law, the mere designation of a right-of-access to the nearest 
roadway of said highway across a 66-foot section of the right of way line should not 
have gone to the jury. The evidence is overwhelming that no legal access to the 
Pioneer Crossing roadway from the TBT property presently exists, and UDOT's own 
witnesses could only state that it may be a road at some unknown date in the future-
conjecture that should not have gone to the jury. Indeed, the Cooperative Agreement 
(Ex. 10) itself does not allow or provide for such a roadway, which only further 
buttresses the fact that the creation of the 66-foot section in the line right-of-way line is 
nothing more than an artifice to give the impression of there being a valid and viable 
access to the TBT property from the Pioneer Crossing roadway. Had the trial judge 
properly ruled as a matter of law that legal access did not exist, the expert appraisers 
would necessarily have provided testimony based upon the actual limited access to the 
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TBT property. Instead, UDOT's expert appraiser, J. Philip Cook, testified that he had 
taken into consideration what he considered to be a valid access to the TBT property in 
determining severance damages. 
"With that access restored that will facilitate development, I lowered my severance 
damages." (Tr. 977) [Emphasis added.] 
This issue on appeal, as well as the issue following on the Complaint amendment 
issue, revolve, to a very large extent around the uncertainty of the construction of a 
"future American Fork street." We provide the following in conclusion of this issue. 
"The benefits must have accrued or be actually or potentially available, permanent, 
definite, and capable of ascertainment, at the time the land appropriated is taken, or 
such as at that time may be reasonably expected immediately to accrue; benefits which 
may originate in the future cannot be allowed ... 
Generally, the burden of proving the existence and amount of special and peculiar 
benefits ... is on the party seeking to condemn the land ... 
Evidence of special benefits must not be speculative and must be reasonably 
probable in order to offset severance damages." 29A CJS Eminent Domain,§ 171, pp. 
424-426. 
This general principle is enunciated in State Dept. of Trans. v. Montgomery Ward 
Dev., 719 P.2d 507 (Or. App. 1986). In this case the State of Oregon brought an 
eminent domain action to construct an access road to a freeway. The state's expert 
testified that in his opinion a portion of an old street would probably be vacated, and the 
defendants would thereby acquire 34,320 square feet, worth $6.00 per square foot, 
result in a claimed offset of $205,000 in the way of a special benefit. Agreeing with 
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defendants' objection to the testimony, the court ruled that "[e]vidence of special 
benefits must not be speculative but must be shown to be reasonably probable."@.at 
512) 
A "future American Fork street," which none ofUDOT's experts could testify as to 
if and/or when it would be built, is merely conjecture, does not constitute a special 
benefit, and therefore does not constitute a basis to mitigate severance damages. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND 
ITS COMPLAINT WHEN THE AMENDMENT FAILED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, TO MATERIALLY CHANGE OR MODIFY THE NATURE AND EXTENT 
OF THE TAKING AND DAMAGES DESCRIBED IN THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT. 
TBT's objection to UDOT's Motion to Amend Complaint was founded primarily 
on the basis that said amendment did not materially modify such complaint and was 
legally insufficient to constitute a basis for mitigation of damages; that UDOT would 
present evidence that at the time of the motion was clearly conjectural, and the 
character of that evidence did not change. UDOT's assertion to the court that they 
would call witnesses from American Fork never materialized. 
The issue of amending the Complaint under Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., arose in the 
case of Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041 (Utah, 1994). There the 
parties were disputing the purchase of coal leases, and one of the parties sought to add 
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a new cause of action based on breach of an alleged joint venture agreement. The 
district court denied the motion to amend, whlch ruling was upheld on appeal. The 
appellate court observed that "[t]he denial of a motion to amend a counterclaim is 
within the broad discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb such a ruling 
absent an abuse of discretion (Id. at I 046), and went on to add, "However, leave to file 
an amended complaint should be denied when 'the moving party seeks to assert a new 
claim that is legally insufficient or futile." @.) 
The motion by UDOT sought to amend the Complaint to include language from 
the Amended Resolution (R. 77), viz. "EXCEPTING and reserving to said Owners, 
their successors or assigns, the right of access to the nearest roadway of said highway 
over and across the Pioneer Crossing right of way line for a 66-foot section." (R. 75) 
When the Motion to Amend Complaint was filed in May 2011, UDOT had already 
acquired by deed dated April 11, 2010 the land occupied for access to the Savage 
property hereinabove referred to. 
UDOT's response to TBT's objection to the Motion to Amend Complaint, 
alleges: 
a. "The Amended Resolution has revised the no access line and an access to a 
future American Fork street has been added." (R. 99)(Emphasis added.) 
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b. During argument on the issue of amending the complaint statements made 
by the court and counsel are considered to be relevant to this issue. In the interest of 
brevity we adopt by reference such statements as provided under Issue No. 1 (pp. 28-
29, supra) as also relevant to this issue. (Tr. of Jan. 9, 2012 hearing, pp 13-15) 
It is abundantly clear from the representations presented by UDOT's counsel to 
the court that UDOT was unable to state "when" or "if' such a future street may exist. 
Further, witnesses for UDOT acknowledges that the area of the stubby road was 
constructed to provide access to the Savage property and Affordable Storage Units 
pursuant to the contract and terms of the warranty deed, contract, and permit referred 
to herein. 
The area identified as the "access road" or "stubby road" is not designated for an 
access opening or street in the Cooperative Agreement between UDOT, Utah County, 
Saratoga Springs, Lehi City and American Fork, which agreement identifies and 
controls access rights and use of the Pioneer Crossing Highway. Such agreement does 
not approve the subject "road" for construction, nor was it approved by American 
Fork. This information was available to and well known by UDOT at the time of oral 
argument on the Motion to Amend Complaint. 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, UDOT sought to establish a claim that it had 
mitigated severance damages by the vague terms of an Amended Complaint that did 
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not contain clear evidence of a roadway as a viable access to TBT' s remainder 
property. The trial judge failed to recognize that the 66-foot section in the "right-of-
way line" failed completely to provide any legal viable access or dedication of a 
roadway to the Pioneer Crossing Highway, over and across lands owned in fee by 
UDOT, that the "stubby road" failed to constitute any basis for mitigation of damages, 
and therefore constituted no justification for an amendment of the complaint. 
UDOT asserted the reason for the Amended Complaint " ... is that the State 
modified the access restriction to the remaining land owned by the Defendant. The 
amendment is necessary for the Complaint to conform with the actual construction on 
the ground [which it did not] (R. 82), and to enable" ... the court or jury ... [to] 
consider such reduction of damages." (R. 80; UDOT citing §78B-6-512(2) U.C.A.) 
Where the amendment is legally insufficient in that regard there is no basis to 
allow the amendment to be filed. "In detennining whether an amended complaint 
should be allowed, where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may 
consider whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the 
amended complaint state a valid claim." Black Canyon Racquetball v. Fist Nat., 804 
p.2d 900, 904 (Idaho 1991). The Idaho court in the case of Bissett v. State, 727 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Id. Ct. App. 1986), stated that "[t]he record which was before the trial 
court contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle Bissett to the injunctive 
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relief he claims." The parallel is exact with the instant case: Even if UDOT proved 
that by some chance in the uncertain future a street would be constructed at the site of 
the stubby road, that would still not, as a matter of law, entitled UDOT to relief, and 
therefore the amendment to the complaint should not have been allowed. 
In ruling on the Motion to Amend Complaint the court appears to rely upon 
UDOT"s claim that" It has now mitigated severance damages because a 'future 
American Fork street" ( a street the parties represent will be built by city of American 
Fork) 'has been added' to the project's plans. This proposed street is to be built at 
some point in the future, according to UDOT' s brief and argument." 
In the instant case the amount of property being condemned by the proposed 
amendment remains unchanged, and the issue of mitigation, on the face of the 
pleadings, is legally insufficient and futile. Thus, as a matter of law, the access 
"reserved," as more fully described in the amended complaint/resolution, does not 
contain operative words of grant, conveyance, license or permit signifying an intent to 
transfer an identifiable interest in property sufficient to constitute a real property 
interest or right-of-way to a public highway. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing UDOT to file the Amended 
Complaint. 
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ISSUE NO. 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT TBT'S COUNSEL WOULD 
NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT CROSS EXAMINATION OF UDOT'S 
EXPERT APPRAISAL WITNESS RELATIVE TO AN APPRAISAL OF THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY CONDUCTED BY SAID WITNESS OF THE PROPERTY 
IN SEPTEMBER, 2008, APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO THE DATE 
OF TAKING IN THIS ACTION, IN REFERENCE TO COMPRABLE SALES AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF MARKET VALUE AS REFLECTED IN SAID REPORT. 
UDOT's appraiser, J. Philip Cook, gave testimony concerning the fair market 
value of the subject property and assessed the amount of just compensation and 
severance damages to be awarded for the taking involved. (Tr. 73 7) He had conducted 
two appraisals ofTBT's property, the first for a valuation date of September 23, 2008 
(Tr. 932), and the second for a valuation date of March 30, 2009. (Tr. 932- 933) 
The first appraisal was addressed to "Mr. Greg Martin, HDR Engineering" and 
stated "the intended use of this report is to assist in negotiating the purchase of the 
property" (Tr. 890-891), and "for whatever purpose that he and I agree to in advance." 
(Tr. 982-983) 
Counsel for TBT began to cross-examine Philip Cook on his asserted claim of 
value of $5,938,035 for the subject property, as set forth in his first appraisal, at which 
time counsel for UDOT objected to such examination (Tr. 924), arguing that the 
appraisal was done for the purpose of determining the amount of money to be 
deposited with the clerk of the court pursuant to §78-6-510, U.C.A., and that said 
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appraisal had been conducted for negotiation purposes. The court sustained the 
objection and the amount identified was stricken from the record and the jury 
admonished to ignore such amount. 
Prior to the objection being sustained, counsel for TBT argued that Philip Cook 
was not being questioned as to what amount was tendered to the court to obtain an 
order of occupancy, but instead, was being asked how he arrived at the fair market 
value in the first appraisal. TBT is entitled to lmow how Philip Cook arrived at the 
figure he did in his first appraisal. In his first appraisal Philip Cook arrived at 
$5,938,035 as the fair market value of the property, but then he performed a second 
appraisal, which was the one UDOT relied upon in the trial. (Tr. 917) 
In reliance on §78B-6-510, U.C.A., cited as authority by counsel for UDOT, the 
court construed the statute to preclude cross examination of the expert witness for 
UDOT on his conclusion of value and matters related to his appraisal of September 23, 
2008. (Tr. 925-931) 
From comments by the court, the statute aforesaid was construed to prohibit 
reference to the "amount" of any appraisal, if the purpose of such value amount was 
for the purpose of obtaining an Order of Occupancy. (Tr. 925-931) No such testimony 
was sought or elicited. The court ruled that the said witness, Philip Cook (Tr. 931 ), 
could be asked the amount of severance damages assessed in both of his appraisals 
43 
and, without making reference to a "dollar amount," state if the amount of value in the 
frrst report was higher or lower than that of the second report. (Tr. 929) 
The record shows counsel for TBT did not seek to elicit any testimony or evidence 
from said adverse witness that a sum of money was arrived at or tendered to the court 
to obtain an Order of Occupancy. (Tr. 927) 
The prejudice created by such restricted examination of a critical valuation witness 
operated to deprive appellant of due process of law and a fair trial. The authorities on 
the subject of cross examination and the significance of such, recognize that the scope 
of cross examination should be broad to ensure protection against estimates that may 
be totally unwarranted. 
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed. § 18.45(2), it states, "The significance of 
allowing a broad scope of cross-examination is often the only protection afforded 
against unwarranted estimates of value." 
It is also generally stated that "[t]he denial of the right to cross examination of a 
material witness is generally error, and the error of refusing to allow a party to cross-
examine a witness or ask him proper questions on cross examination is not cured by 
the fact that the party subsequently calls the witness .... " 98 CJS Witnesses §375 p. 
129. 
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Our Utah Supreme Court in Malia v. Seeley., 57 P.2d 357,360 (Utah 1936), while 
holding that the extent of cross-examination rests largely within the trial court's sound 
discretion, went on to rule that "[a] party has a right on cross-examination to draw out 
anything which would tend to contradict, weaken, modify or explain the testimony 
given by a witness." 
In Babinec v. State of Alaska, 586 P .2d 966, 967(Alaska 1978), the court held: 
"The scope of cross-examination of an expert who has testified to the 
value of land in an eminent domain proceeding is very broad since cross-
examination of the expert witness is the primary protection which an 
opposing party has against unwarranted estimates. We have encouraged 
"liberal, flexible, thorough examination" in these types of proceedings to 
aid the trier of fact in determinmg the best estimate of value." 
It is well settled that "[t]he value of the opinion evidence of a witness may be 
tested by showing that upon a fonner occasion he expressed a different opinion, or 
made statements inconsistent with the opinion expressed" State v. Murata, 326 P.2d 
947, 954 (Cal. 1958) [Emphasis added.] The California court went on to rule, quoting 
from 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed. 1940) 733, 1041, that "[i]t is almost universal 
rule '[t]hat expert opinions, as well as other opinions ordinarily admissible, if 
inconsistent with those expressed on the stand, are receivable." [Emphasis in original] 
In summary, the error in denying full cross-examination of the witness on different 
values in two separate appraisals for the same property constituted substantial 
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prejudice which, viewed in combination with the other issues presented in this appeal, 
operated to deprive appellant of a fair trial and due process of law. 
ISSUE NO. 4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO VIEW THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY THAT INCLUDES THE DISPUTED ACCESS AREA BECAUSE 
SUCH CONVEYS AN UNWARRANTED FALSE AND PREJUDICIAL ELEMENT 
OF VALIDITY OF THE ALLEGED ACCESS, WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OR TESTMONY. G 
Allowing a jury view of the subject property that involves the disputed access area 
conveys an unwarranted false and prejudicial element of implied validity of said 
access, which is not supported by credible evidence, testimony, or law. 
The court authorized a jury view of the subject property, notwithstanding 
objection by TBT. (Tr. 775, 778, 784) The court, explaining the basis for allowing a 
view stated, "I really want to show them the access, if it is an access, if it is a viable 
access ... I think it better let them see everything, because this is a complicated case." 
(Tr. 778) 
There exists considerable authority for the broad discretionary power of the court 
in allowing a view of the premises in actions of this nature. 77 A.L.R.2d 548; 5 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed. §18.3(3); Rule 47 URCP; State Road Comm. v. 
Marriott, 444 P.2d 57 (Utah 1968). However, exceptions exist to the discretionary 
authority of the court. In Reuth v. State, 644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Idaho 1982), the court 
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stated: "[a] view ought to be avoided unless the court is satisfied that the conditions of 
the premises are the same on the day of the view as they were at the time the matter 
arose and that a view is reasonably necessary to do justice." 
In State Road Comm. v. White, 449 P.2d 114, 115 (Utah 1969), our Supreme 
Court, stated, ruled as follows: 
"There is no method by which there may be preserved in a bill of 
exceptions the evidence of the manner in or extent to which minds of the 
various members of the jury were impressed by a view ... where such 
changes have taken place as to render a view of no assistance to the jury, 
for the reason that the condition at the time of trial does not reflect the value 
as of the time the petitioner was filed, it is an abuse of discretion to permit 
such view." Citing City of Chicago v. Koff, 173 N.E. 666 (1930) 
In Provo River Water Assn. v. Carlson, 133 P.2d 777, 782 (Utah 1943), the court 
stated that "jurors as well as judges must base their verdicts or decisions on the 
evidence presented during trial, not on the basis of some independent investigation or 
detennination of the facts outside of the court." 
The problem with allowing a jury view in this case stems from the same issues 
raised in the Objection to Amend Complaint and TBT's Motion in Limine in Re: 
Access. As described above, the taking of TBT's fee land also included "all access 
rights appurtenant to the remaining Granters' property for direct access onto Pioneer 
Crossing, the limited-access highway. EXCEPTING and reserving to said Owners ... 
the right of access to the nearest roadway of said highway over and across the Pioneer 
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Crossing right of way line for a 66-foot section .... " (R. 75-Amended 
Condemnation Resolution) 
Discovery, testimonies and evidence have identified an area extending north to the 
American Fork City line from the north lane of the east-west Pioneer Crossing 
Highway, that has been improved as a roadway (Ex. 6), extending north approximately 
Q 
75 feet to the American Fork City line (Tr. 161), leaving the previously described Gr:.l 
unimproved triangular piece between the American Fork City line and the TB T 
property line. (Tr. 715-716) 
When considering the court's own statement-"if it is an access, it is a viable 
access"-together with testimony of witnesses for UDOT that the "access area" is a 
"future American Fork City street" or "future City street" and unable to state when or 
if such a street may exist. (Tr. 707) With this evidence, coupled with testimony from 
the project engineer for UDOT that the "purpose of building the stubby road was to 
provide access to the boundary of the Savage property" (Tr. 718), we fail to see how a 
view by the jury could achieve any purpose other than to invite a false and prejudicial 
element of implied validity of access. 
A jury view, under the foregoing circumstances, improperly and adversely 
influenced the jurors with respect to an objective valuation of the property at date of 
talcing. 
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ISSUE NO. 5 
THE JURY VERDICT IS NOT WITHIN THE RANGE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE 
OR TESTMONY. 
Jonathan Cook, an expert fee appraiser for TB T testified that if there was no valid 
access to the remainder tract from Pioneer Crossing Highway, the severance damages 
to the remainder were $3,646,327. (Tr. 593) However, the experts for TBT, both Mr. 
Cook and Jerry Webber, took their cue from the judge's ruling that the existence of an 
access would be decided by the jury and prepared appraisals reflecting a possible 
fincting of some kind of access to the Pioneer Crossing Highway. Again, this 
necessitated an appraisal based upon there being a finding by the jury that an access to 
the subject property existed. 
By Jonathan Cook: 
Well, we looked at the second scenario and looked at how access was put 
on the property. In other words, this stubby road or opening on Pioneer 
Crossing, you know, how would that affect the value of the property after 
the take, especially that southeast comer. We . . . looked at some pictures 
before we took a break that, you know, it's really just kind of an access to 
the storage units and kind of a shared access. It's kind of questionable 
access, is basically what it is. 
And ... I looked at the cooperative agreement to confirm that, it's not 
even listed in the cooperative agreement with the cities, the counties, or 
UDOT. It's -the Savage access agreements indicates that it goes to a 
future city road. There's no city road that it goes to. There's a gap 
between the lines of the right-of-way and the limited-access line. There's 
just a lot of questions about that access and whether or not ... that's good 
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access, but that being said, we did another scenario based on an access to 
the southeast portion. (Tr. 606-607) 
Within these parameters Mr. Cook testified that the severance damages was 
$2,199,686. (Tr. 615; Ex. 25) 
Jerry Webber, MAI, retained after the issue of a possible access being present, 
found the fair market value of the fee take to be $2,963,842.00, $16,692.00 for the 
easements, and severance damages of $2,784,782.00, for a total of $5,765,317.00. (R. 
410-413; Ex. 24) 
UDOT's sole appraiser, J. Philip Cook, did his appraisal based upon the premise 
there was a valid and viable access from TBT' s property to the Pioneer Crossing 
highway. "With that access restored that will facilitate development, I lowered my 
severance damages." (Tr. 977) [Emphasis added.] Those severance damages 
amounted to $51,000.00. 
If this court finds that there was error in allowing the jury to determine the 
validity of such access as a basis for mitigation of damages or if this court finds that 
the trial court at some point ruled there was an access but such ruling was in error, then Q 
the appraisal of J. Philip Cook is not valid, and the verdict is not within the range of 
the valid expert testimony. 
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This is critical for the reason that "[i]n eminent domain cases, absent a showing of 
passion and prejudice, if the award of compensation was within the estimate of value 
given by one of the expert witnesses, it is supported by competent evidence and will be 
affirmed." UDOT v. Jones, 694 P.2d at 1033. It is clear that Philip Cook's value of 
severance damages was based upon there being a valid and viable access to the 
remainder tract from Pioneer Crossing Highway. If the underlying basis of his 
testimony fails then the jury verdict is not within the range of the expert testimony and 
must fail. 
ISSUE NO. 6 
THE MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND THE BUILDING OF THE 
ROADWAY IN QUESTION CONSTITUTED A BAD FAITH EFFORT BY UDOT 
TO A VOID PA YING JUST COMPENSATION AND ENTITLES TBT TO 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
To find that a party acted in "bad faith" the trial court must find that one or more 
of the following factors existed: ( 1) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety 
of the activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of 
others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted within the lmowledge that the activities in 
question would binder, delay, or defraud others. V alcarce, 961 P .2d at 316. 
All such elements exist in this case. More than one year before allegedly creating 
access for TBT, UDOT actually created an access to the Savage property (Affordable 
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Storage), to avoid paying damages on the basis of a landlocked property, utilizing land 
then and still owned by UDOT. Recognizing that a private right in a public 
thoroughfare can only be allowed by permissive use (Kohler, 916 P.2d at 914), UDOT 
entered into agreements with Savage in the form of a reservation in the Warranty Deed 
from Savage that acknowledged a right of access over the right-of-way to a "future city 
street;" an Access Approval Pennit and a Right of Way Contract, subject to all 
regulations for control and protection of State Highway rights-of-way, among other 
restrictions. (Ex. 5, TR. 197-298) 
UDOT, as a member of the Cooperative Agreement, which makes no provision for 
the access here in question, has carefully avoided identifying the access (stubby road) 
as an existing road or highway, employing language such as "future city street," and 
"future American Fork city street," and alleging that such street will exist if, and when 
the city wants to build such a road. 
The concept that such a nebulous design would constitute a basis for mitigation of 
severance damages to the property ofTBT strongly suggests a disingenuous motive 
and manipulative effort to avoid payment of just compensation, and adherence to the 
constitutional principle of Due Process of Law. 
As shown throughout the Statement of Facts and Issues One and Two above, 
UDOT was well aware, or should have been aware, that their experts viewed the 
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stubby road with suspicion, knew that it was of limited use, was at best a "future 
American Fork street," that there were no plans in place for any governmental entity to 
build or dedicate such a road in the foreseeable or determinative future, and that it in 
no way conformed with the Cooperative Agreement between the various governmental 
entities involved. UDOT's own project engineer and Oversight Manager for projects 
were unable to say if, when or how a viable access road to the TBT property would be 
built. UDOT had this information available when the Motion to Amend Complaint 
was filed and in reply to a direct inquiry from the court, during the hearing on the 
Motion to Amend Complaint, when asked by the judge to explain how a jury is 
supposed to determine the future road that may not be there, counsel for UDOT 
responded, in part, "[t]hey'll have the assistance of appraisers ... We'll probably bring 
American Fork Planners to talk to them about that." No American Fork Planners were 
produced as witnesses. To what extent the ruling of the court may have been 
influenced by this representation that planners from American Fork City would 
probably be called to testify is unknown, but remains an issue we believe may have 
contributed to the adverse ruling on TBT's Objection to Amend Complaint. 
The statement of the court in UDOT v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481, 492-493, 
(Utah 1979), merits attention: 
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"[Just compensation is required in Art. I, §22, Constitution of Utah.] The 
court observed that in view of this constitutional provision, the awarding of 
just compensation should be the care of the condemning authority as well 
as that of the condemnee ... Unlike litigation between private parties 
condemnation by any governmental authority should not be a matter of 
"dog eat dog" or "win at any cost." Such attitude and procedure would be 
decidedly unfair to the property owner. He would be at a disadvantage in 
every instance for the reason that the government has unlimited resources 
created by the inexhaustible power of taxation... If the governmental unit 
or agency is seeking to effectuate the "summum bonum," as it should in 
ever [sic] condemnation suit, there is no justification for cutting comers or 
being secretive to the possible detriment of the individual land owner 
whose property is being taken from hlm against hls will. [Emphasis added.] 
As argued to the trial court, this was a boot-strap attempt by UDOT to portray a 
private drive for Savage as a viable road for TBT. This situation brings to mind a 
statement by Abraham Lincoln, wherein he queried, "How many legs does a dog have 
if you call the tail a leg? Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn't make it a leg." Calling the 
private drive for Savage a valid access road in the future for TBT doesn't make it one. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling that this seeking to amend the Complaint was 
not done in bad faith (R. 142), UDOT knew the limitations, knew the law, and knew 
what it was doing. In such circumstances TBT is entitled to its attorney fees for this 
appeal, and the added costs for trial. Our Supreme Court in the case of Stewart v. 
Utah Public Service Cornm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994) stated that "[I]n the 
absence of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent equitable 
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power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems appropriate in the interest of 
justice and equity." 
Applying this ruling, this Court of Appeals in Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 
1058, (Utah App. 1995), held "courts have used their equitable power to award 
attorney fees where a party has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons." 
Given the overall circumstances of this case, TBT should be awarded fees and 
costs due to the bad faith nature of the claims and positions taken by UDOT in this 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
The designation in the amended complaint of a 66 foot section over the right-of-
way line did not define, constitute or establish a viable or legal access from TBT' s 
remaining land to an established highway or roadway and thus such could not, as a 
matter oflaw, constitute a basis for mitigation of damages pursuant to §§78B-6-511 
and 512, U.C.A. Accordingly the trial court erred in allowing UDOT to file an 
amended complaint. The trial court then erred in giving a clear decision of law to a 
fact finding jmy, namely whether or not a viable, legal access had been created by the 
amendment and could thereby mitigate damages. 
55 
The trial court erred in denying TBT the opportunity to fully conduct cross 
examination ofUDOT's only appraiser on an appraisal he had performed 
approximately six month before the taking in this case. 
The last error by the trial court was that of allowing the jury to view the subject 
property, including the disputed access area. Such view created a prejudicial element 
of the validity and legality of such access, when as described herein, no actual legal or 
viable access exists. 
Such errors resulted in a jury award that is not within the range of credible 
evidence. Given that no legal access to Pioneer Crossing Highway truly exists, the 
only evidence presented to the jury on severance damages without such access is that 
of Jonathan Cook's appraisal and testimony which allocated such damages at 
$3,646,327.00. Thus the jury award of $1,044,091.00 in severance damages is not 
supported by the evidence. 
Wherefore, TBT respectfully requests that a new trial be granted. In the 
alternative, the jury award as to severance damages should be set at $3,646,327.00 as 
being the only credible evidence on such damages absent actual access to Pioneer 
Crossing Highway. 
Lastly, given that UDOT had full knowledge, or should have lmown, of what their 
own witnesses would say as to the validity and legal existence of access by way of the 
. 
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"stubby road", amending the complaint was not conducted in good faith as UDOT 
knew, or should have known, that the 66 foot section did not constitute a legal and 
currently existing access point to any road. Based on such bad faith TBT should be 
awarded their attorney fees for both this appeal and the trial court proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLLY SUBMITTED this ~y of June, 2013. 
TH. WALL 
all & Wall, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant-Defendant, TBT Properties Management, Inc. was served by mail, postage 
prepaid on this the 5 day of June, 2013: 
Brent A. Burnett No. 4003 
Barbara H. Ochoa No. 4102 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160 E. 300 S., 5th Fl. 
P.O. Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Appellee 
ADDENDUM A 
§78B-6-511, U.C.A. Compensation and damages -- How assessed. 
~ The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and detennine and assess: 
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
pe11aining to the realty; 
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property; and 
( c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each 
estate or interest in each shall be separate! y assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the 
construction of the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate 
or interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the improvement 
proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under Subsection 
(2), the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the 
portion taken; but if the benefit is less than the damages assessed, the fom1er shall be 
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition 
to the value of the portion taken; 
(5) if the property sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a 
water delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or 
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the 
system's carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment; 
( 6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought 
to be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, taldng 
into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and harvesting the 
crops; and 
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages 
separately. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session. 
® 
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§78B-6-512, U.C.A. Damages -- When right has accrued -- Mitigation or reduction 
-- Improvements. 
(1) For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right to 
compensation and damages shall be considered to have accrued at the date of the service 
of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be the measw·e of compensation for all 
property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but 
injuriously affected, in all cases where damages are allowed, as provided in Section 78B-
6-51 l. 
(2) The court or the jury shall consider mitigation or reduction of damages in its 
assessment of compensation and damages if, after the date of the service of summons, the 
plaintiff: 
(a) mitigates the damages to the property; or 
(b) reduces the amount of property actually taken. 
(3) Improvements put upon the property by the property owner subsequent to the 
date of service of summons may not be included in the assessment of compensation or 
damages. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Corridor PreservationTong Pioneer Crossing Road . "\ , ··= 
from SR-68 to US-89 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS Q 9 8 9 Q 7 
Federal ID No. 870575087 
LEID CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000240 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000209 
,,. AJTA.HCOUNTY 
1 Q 6 1 ~ed~ ID No. 876000312 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT 
THIS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, made and entered into this \?--th_ day of f.,(:k , 20 oq , by and between the UTAHDEP ARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
here~ er referied to as "UDOT" and CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS, LEID CITY, 
AMERICAN FqRKCITY, and UTAH COtJNTY, allofwbicb are Municipal Corporations in the 
State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "LOCAL AGENCY", 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to establish and preserve a corridor along the proposed 
Pioneer Crossing Road alignment from SR-68 in Saratoga Springs to US-89 in American Fork City, 
Utah County, to facilitate traffic flow, to be in accordance with each LOCAL AGENCY's current 
Transportation Pian, and to be in accordance with UDOT's Access Management Standards and 
practices. See attached map of Pioneer Crossing Road. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is agreed by and between the parties hereto as follows: 
I. The following intersections are identified as existing, eropos~ or future traffic signal 
locations along Pioneer Crossing Road within the resp.ective. city.limits. or within Utah County: .. _ . 
• SR-68 (Saratoga Springs) 
• 300 East approx. (Saratoga Springs)/ 
10400 West approx. (County) 
• 3400 West approx. (Lehi) 
• 2300 West (Lehi)/9550 West (County) 
• 1700 West (Lebi)/9150 West (County) 
• 1100 West (Lehi)/8730 West (County) 
• 500 West (Lehi)/8350 West (County) 
• Center St (Lehi)/8000 West (County) 
• 3 00 Bast (Lehi) 
• 60© East approx. (Lehi) 
• 85@ East/Mill Pond Road (Lehi) 
• Vmeyard Connector (American Fork) 
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_(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
(Future) 
(Proposed) 
(Proposed) 
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.. \ • Corridor Preservation tong Pioneer Crossing Road from SR-68 to US-89 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS 
Federal ID No. 870575087 
LEID CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000240 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000209 
UTAH COUNTY 
Federal ID No. 876000312 
• Iri,terstate 15 SB ramps (American Fork) 
0 fliterstate 15 NB ramps (American Fork) 
(Existing to be modified) 
(Existing to be modified) 
(Proposed) • 6~0 West (American Fork) 
• ~-89 (American Fork) (Existing) 
The m.tersections of SR-68, 1700 West, and 850 East have been identified in the Pioneer 
Crossmg Traffic Study as locations where traffic signals will be built as part of the 
project, even though they have not been warranted by the normal warranting process. 
The il;itersection of 300 East will be eliminated when the future 600 East (approx.) 
inters~ction is constructed. If there is a traffic signal at the 300 East intersection, it will 
be ''relocated" to 600 East (approx.). 
! 
2. Propo~ed traffic signals listed in #1 above except for SR-68, 1700 West, and 850 East 
will not be installbd until warranted by UDOT. No other -access to Pioneer Crossing Road will be 
allowed except f9r the existing UT A Park and Ride facility in the northeast quadrant of the I-
15/Pioneer Cros$,gRoad interchange. This access will become a permanentright in/out only access 
during constructi.bn. It is understood that it may be necessary to restrict certain types of traffic 
movements at an~ intersection in order to maintain traffic flow and improve safety through the 
conidor as agreeq upon by the parties hereto. 
; 
. - . - . -· . .. - . i -· . . - - - . ···- - . . -· . . ' - . . - . . - - . . - - . - ' - . -
3. A UD9T Highway Access Management Standards Category 3 is established for this 
corridor with modifications as follows: Minimum traffic signal spacing is 2,640 feet except as noted 
I 
in #1 above. .AJll of the intersections listed above shall be prepared for signalization during 
construction of Pioneer Crossing Road, consisting of underground conduit and junction boxes, and 
may be opened toltraffic without signalization. 
! 
4. Pioneer Crossing Road is hereby designated as a.Limited Access facility. 
! 
! 
5. The p$es hereto shall consider the concepts contained herein during the development 
of any master platjs in this area and work towards the common goal of this Agreement. 
1 
I 
I 
6. In the ekrent there are changes in the concepts or provisions covered by this Agreement, 
a modification to~ Agreement approved in writing by both parties hereto is required to place them 
in effect i 
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r,~ • Corridor Preservation.mg Pioneer Crossing Road from SR-68 to US-89 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS 
Federal ID No. 870575087 
LEHI CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000240 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000209 
UTAH COUNTY 
Federal ID No. 876000312 
IN MTNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be executed by 
their duly authorized officers as of the day and year first above written. · 
ATTEST: 
(IMJ>RESS SEAL) 
~ ATTEST: 
By.-4-....,q.~~~+--~~~---
Title: --L..li!:1;4,,4,C~~-------
Date: ----1-----=--..,,.._.""-+--------
-- . - - - - - - - -
(IMPRESS SEAQ,) 
ATTEST: 
• (-th [) , 
By: __ ~ _____ ....,: ~t ~Olj__=-----
Title: CITYi~ER 
Date: -=--=--=--=--=--=-':./:/~,-rn}f:J-:-=.,:'t=========== 
l _,d~~ ..... -
CITY OF SARATOGi\SPRINGS, a 
Municipal Corporatioi;jn the State of 
By: 
Title: -~~~£:F-?'------~-r-,--=--f-,.~ 
Date: ___ rr---~~~1:..-yL--~---
LEIDCITY,a 
M;ration in the.State of Utah. 
~[~e:' %J:J{~ 
Date: /- z..o - o, 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, a 
Municip~ o/JP°ration in the.State of Utah 
By. wwtf~ 
Title: ' //1{4<fJI r 
Date: l..f /; ~/pq 
7 
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ATTEST: 
Corridor PreservatioJA\ng Pioneer Crossing Road 
from SR-68 to US-89 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS 
Federal ID No. 870575087 
LEHI CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000240 
AMERICAN FORK CITY 
Federal ID No. 876000209 
UTAHCOUNTY 
Federal ID No. 876000312 
UTAH COUNTY, a 
Municipal Corporation in the State of Utah 
By: ~.L-ff-!~~,.:;=:::~~;.,Q,ld..ad~~~ 
Title: .......,..;~-F.-M~~----;.~~...., 
Date: .-;:w.,...;;:;;,:..i~------s-.......+--~ 
(IMPRESS SEAI}) 
**************~*************************************************************** 
RECOMMEND~D FOR APPROVAL: UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
APPROVED ASjTO FORM: 
This Form Agreedient has been previously 
I 
approved as to fom:n by the office of Legal 
Counsel for the ~ah Department of 
Transportation. 1 
B~~ 
... 
Date: 5- 2 Co =cf} 
CO:MPTR.OLLEROFFICE 
By __ C_.o~--J~Ji,<-K~~~.,P:-al.J-r~---
Date: ____ ~----"'-...._~--
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ADDENDUMD 
LEHI CITY 
(INC OR PORA TED) 
PARCEL 2440:E 
0-078 IICRE I 3.408 S Q.FT. 
PARCEL 2440:2E 
0.357 ACRE 115,540 SQ.FT. 
MILL POND 
REMAINING PARCEL 
4Z,169 ACRE 
EXHIBIT 
MAP SHOWING THE PROPERTY OF 
TBT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC. 
AND THAT PORTION REQUIRED FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES. 
PROJECT No. S-I15-6(175)245 
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